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ABSTRACT
e growing adoption of distributed data processing frameworks in
a wide diversity of application domains challenges end-to-end inte-
gration of properties like security, in particular when considering
deployments in the context of large-scale clusters or multi-tenant
Cloud infrastructures.
is paper therefore introduces SecureStreams, a reactive mid-
dleware framework to deploy and process secure streams at scale.
Its design combines the high-level reactive dataow programming
paradigm with Intel®’s low-level soware guard extensions (SGX)
in order to guarantee privacy and integrity of the processed data.
e experimental results of SecureStreams are promising: while
oering a uent scripting language based on Lua, our middleware
delivers high processing throughput, thus enabling developers to
implement secure processing pipelines in just few lines of code.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e data deluge imposed by a world of ever-connected devices,
whose most emblematic example is the Internet of ings (IoT),
has fostered the emergence of novel data analytics and process-
ing technologies to cope with the ever increasing volume, velocity,
and variety of information that characterize the big data era. In
particular, to support the continuous ow of information gathered
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by millions of IoT devices, data streams have emerged as a suit-
able paradigm to process ows of data at scale. However, as some
of these data streams may convey sensitive information, stream
processing requires support for end-to-end security guarantees in
order to prevent third parties accessing restricted data.
is paper therefore introduces SecureStreams, our initial work
on a middleware framework for developing and deploying secure
stream processing on untrusted distributed environments. Secure-
Streams supports the implementation, deployment, and execution
of stream processing tasks in distributed seings, from large-scale
clusters to multi-tenant Cloud infrastructures. More specically,
SecureStreams adopts a message-oriented [28] middleware, which
integrates with the SSL protocol [30] for data communication and
the current version of Intel®’s soware guard extensions (SGX) [27]
to deliver end-to-end security guarantees along data stream pro-
cessing stages. SecureStreams can scale vertically and horizon-
tally by adding or removing processing nodes at any stage of the
pipeline, for example to dynamically adjust according to the current
workload. e design of the SecureStreams system is inspired
by the dataow programming paradigm [48]: the developer com-
bines together several independent processing components (e.g.,
mappers, reducers, sinks, shuers, joiners) to compose specic
processing pipes. Regarding packaging and deployment, Secure-
Streams smoothly integrates with industrial-grade lightweight
virtualization technologies like Docker [9].
In this paper, we propose the following contributions: (i) we
describe the design of SecureStreams, (ii) we provide details of
our reference implementation, in particular on how to smoothly
integrate our runtime inside an SGX enclave, and (iii) we perform
an extensive evaluation with micro-benchmarks, as well as with a
real-world dataset.
e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To beer
understand the design of SecureStreams, Section 2 delivers a brief
introduction to today’s SGX operating mechanisms. e archi-
tecture of SecureStreams is then introduced in Section 3. Our
implementation choices and an example of a SecureStreams pro-
gram are reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our extensive
evaluation, presenting a detailed analysis of micro-benchmark per-
formances, as well as more comprehensive macro-benchmarks with
real-world datasets. Some related works to this topic are gathered
in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 briey describes our future work
and concludes.
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Figure 1: SGX core operating principles.
2 SGX LIGHTNING TOUR
e design of SecureStreams revolves around the availability of
SGX features in the host machines. It consists in a trusted execu-
tion environment (TEE) recently introduced into Intel® SkyLake,
similar in spirit to ARM TrustZone [2] but much more powerful.
Applications create secure enclaves to protect the integrity and the
condentiality of the data and the code being executed.
e SGX mechanism, as depicted in Figure 1, allows applications
to access condential data from inside the enclave. e architec-
ture guarantees that an aacker with physical access to a machine
will not be able to tamper with the application data without being
noticed. e CPU package represents the security boundary. More-
over, data belonging to an enclave is automatically encrypted and
authenticated when stored in main memory. A memory dump on a
victim’s machine will produce encrypted data. A remote aestation
protocol allows one to verify that an enclave runs on a genuine
Intel® processor with SGX. An application using enclaves must
ship a signed (not encrypted) shared library (a shared object le in
Linux) that can possibly be inspected by malicious aackers.
In the current version of SGX, the enclave page cache (EPC) is
a 128MB area of memory1 predened at boot to store enclaved
code and data. At most around 90MB can be used by application’s
memory pages, while the remaining area is used to maintain SGX
metadata. Any access to an enclave page that does not reside in the
EPC triggers a page fault. e SGX driver interacts with the CPU
to choose which pages to evict. e trac between the CPU and
the system memory is kept condential by the memory encryption
engine (MEE) [31], also in charge of tamper resistance and replay
protection. If a cache miss hits a protected region, the MEE encrypts
or decrypts data before sending to, respectively fetching from, the
system memory and performs integrity checks. Data can also be
persisted on stable storage protected by a seal key. is allows the
storage of certicates, waiving the need of a new remote aestation
every time an enclave application restarts.
e execution ow of a program using SGX enclaves is like the
following. First, an enclave is created (see Figure 1-Ê). As soon
as a program needs to execute a trusted function (Ë), it executes
SGX’s primitive ecall (Ì). e call goes through the SGX call gate
1Future releases of SGX might relax this limitation [37].
to bring the execution ow inside the enclave (Í). Once the trusted
function is executed by one of the enclave’s threads (Î), its result
is encrypted and sent back (Ï) before giving back the control to
the main processing thread (Ð).
3 ARCHITECTURE
e architecture of SecureStreams comprises a combination of
two dierent types of base components: worker and router. A
worker component continuously listens for incoming data by means
of non-blocking I/O. As soon as data ows in, an application-
dependent business logic is applied. A typical use-case is the de-
ployment of a classic lter/map/reduce paern from the functional
programming paradigm [24]. In such a case, worker nodes execute
only one function, namely map, filter, or reduce. A router com-
ponent acts as a message broker between workers in the pipeline
and transfers data between them according to a given dispatching
policy. Figure 2 depicts a possible implementation of this dataow
paern using the SecureStreams middleware.
SecureStreams is designed to support the processing of sensi-
tive data inside SGX enclaves. As explained in the previous section,
the enclave page cache (EPC) is currently limited to 128MB. To over-
come this limitation, we seled on a lightweight yet ecient em-
beddable runtime, based on the Lua virtual machine (LuaVM) [32]
and the corresponding multi-paradigm scripting language [15]. e
Lua runtime requires only few kilobytes of memory, it is designed
to be embeddable, and as such it represents an ideal candidate to
execute in the limited space allowed by the EPC. Moreover, the
application-specic functions can be quickly prototyped in Lua,
and even complex algorithms can be implemented with an almost
1:1 mapping from pseudo-code [35]. We provide further imple-
mentation details of the embedding of the LuaVM inside an SGX
enclave in Section 4.
Each component is wrapped inside a lightweight Linux container
(in our case, the de facto industrial standard Docker [9]). Each con-
tainer embeds all the required dependencies, while guaranteeing
the correctness of their conguration, within an isolated and repro-
ducible execution environment. By doing so, a SecureStreams pro-
cessing pipeline can be easily deployed without changing the source
code on dierent public or private infrastructures. For instance, this
will allow developers to deploy SecureStreams to Amazon EC2
container service [1], where SkyLake-enabled instances will soon
be made available [4], or similarly to Google compute engine [12].
e deployment of the containers can be transparently executed
on a single machine or a cluster, using a Docker network and the
Docker Swarm scheduler [11].
e communication between workers and routers leverages
ZeroMQ, a high-performance asynchronous messaging library [21].
Each router component hosts inbound and outbound queues. In
particular, the routers use the ZeroMQ’s pipeline paern [22] with
the Push-Pull socket types.
e inbound queue is a Pull socket. e messages are streamed
from a set of anonymous2 Push peers (e.g., the upstream workers
in the pipeline). e inbound queue uses a fair-queuing scheduling
to deliver the message to the upper layer. Conversely, the outbound
2Anonymous refers to a peer without any identity: the server socket ignores which
worker sent the message.
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Figure 2: Example of SecureStreams pipeline architecture.
queue is a Push socket, sending messages using a round-robin
algorithm to a set of anonymous Pull peers—e.g., the downstream
workers.
is design allows us to dynamically scale up and down each
stage of the pipeline in order to adapt it to application’s needs or
the workload. Finally, ZeroMQ guarantees that the messages are
delivered across each stage via reliable TCP channels.
We dene the processing pipeline components and their chain-
ing by means of Docker’s Compose [10] description language.
Listing 1 reports on a snippet of the description used to deploy
the architecture in Figure 2. Once the processing pipeline is de-
ned, the containers must be deployed on the computing infras-
tructure. We exploit the constraint placement mechanisms to
enforce the Docker Swarm’s scheduler in order to deploy workers
requiring SGX capabilities into appropriate hosts. In the example,
an sgx mapper nodes is deployed on an SGX host by specifying
"constraint:type==sgx" in the Compose description.
1 sgx_mapper:
2 image: "${IMAGE_SGX}"
3 entrypoint: ./start.sh sgx -mapper.lua
4 environment:
5 - TO=tcp:// router_mapper_filter:5557
6 - FROM=tcp:// router_data_mapper:5556
7 - "constraint:type==sgx"
8 devices:
9 - "/dev/isgx"
10
11 router_data_mapper:
12 image: "${IMAGE}"
13 hostname: router_data_mapper
14 entrypoint: lua router.lua
15 environment:
16 - TO=tcp://*:5556
17 - FROM=tcp://*:5555
18 - "constraint:type==sgx"
19
20 data_stream:
21 image: "${IMAGE}"
22 entrypoint: lua data -stream.lua
23 environment:
24 - TO=tcp:// router_data_mapper:5555
25 - "constraint:type==sgx"
26 - DATA_FILE=the_stream.csv
Listing 1: SecureStreams pipeline examples. Some
attributes (volume, networks, env file) are omitted.
4 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
SecureStreams is implemented in Lua (v5.3). e implementation
of the middleware itself requires careful engineering, especially
with respect to the integration in the SGX enclaves (explained later).
However, a SecureStreams use-case can be implemented in re-
markably few lines of code. For instance, the implementation of
the map/lter/reduce accounts for only 120 lines of code (with-
out counting the dependencies). e framework partially extends
RxLua [17], a library for reactive programming in Lua. RxLua
provides to the developer the required API to design a data stream
processing pipeline following a dataow programming paern [48].
Listing 2 provides an example of a RxLua program (and conse-
quently a SecureStreams program) to compute the average age of
a population by chaining :map, :filter, and :reduce functions.3
e :subscribe function performs the subscription of 3 functions
to the data stream. Following the observer design paern [46], these
functions are observers, while the data stream is an observable.
1 Rx.Observable.fromTable(people)
2 :map(
3 function(person)
4 return person.age
5 end
6 )
7 :filter(
8 function(age)
9 return age > 18
10 end
11 )
12 :reduce(
13 function(accumulator , age)
14 accumulator[count] = (accumulator.count
3Note that in our evaluation the code executed by each worker is conned into its
own Lua le.
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15 or 0) + 1
16 accumulator[sum] = (accumulator.sum
17 or 0) + age
18 return accumulator
19 end
20 )
21 :subscribe(
22 function(datas)
23 print("Adult people average:",
24 datas.sum / datas.count)
25 end ,
26 function(err)
27 print(err)
28 end ,
29 function ()
30 print("Process complete!")
31 end
32 )
Listing 2: Example of process pipeline with RxLua.
SecureStreams dynamically ships the business logic for each
component into a dedicated Docker container and executes it. e
communication between the Docker containers (the router and
the worker components) happens through ZeroMQ (v4.1.2) and
the corresponding Lua bindings [16]. Basically, SecureStreams
abstracts the underlying network and computing infrastructure
from the developer, by relying on ZeroMQ and Docker.
Under the SGX threat model where the system soware is com-
pletely untrusted, system calls are not allowed inside secure en-
claves. As a consequence, porting a legacy application or runtime,
such as the Lua interpreter, is challenging. To achieve this task,
we traced all system calls made by the interpreter to the standard
C library and replaced them by alternative implementations that
either mimic the real behavior or discard the call. Our changes to
the vanilla Lua source code consist of the addition of about 600
lines of code, or 2.5 % of its total size. By doing so, Lua programs
operating on les, network sockets or any other input/output de-
vice do not execute as they normally do outside the enclaves. is
inherent SGX limitation also reinforces the system security guar-
antees oered to the application developers. e SecureStreams
framework safely ships the data and code to enclaves. Hence, the
Lua scripts executed within the SGX enclave do not use (read/write)
les or sockets. Wrapper functions are nevertheless installed in the
SGX-enabled LuaVM to prevent any of such aempts.
An additional constraint imposed by the secure SGX enclaves is
the impossibility of dynamically linking code. e reason is that
the assurance that a given code is running inside a SGX-enabled
processor is made through the measurement of its content when
the enclave is created. More specically, this measurement is the
result of EREPORT instruction, an SGX-specic report that computes
a cryptographically secure hash of code, data and a few data struc-
tures, which overall builds a snapshot of the state of the enclave
(including threads, memory heap size, etc.) and the processor (secu-
rity version numbers, keys, etc.). Allowing more code to be linked
dynamically at runtime would break the assurance given by the
aestation mechanism on the integrity of the code being executed,
allowing for example an aacker to load a malicious library inside
the enclave.
SGX enclave
 SGX 
Crypto
 Enclaved LuaVM
Vulnerable Code
 Crypto C++  Vanilla LuaVM
 lua-sgx binding
 RxLua
 zmq
sgxprocess(code,data)
sgxencrypt(key,data)
sgxdecrypt(key,data)
SGX ECall
C proxy
 secure execution
code(data)
Figure 3: Integration between Lua and Intel® SGX.
In the case of Lua, a direct consequence is the impossibility
of loading Lua extensions using the traditional dynamic linking
technique. Every extension has to be statically compiled and packed
with the enclave code. To ease the development of SecureStreams
applications, we statically compiled json [3], and csv [43] parsers
within our enclaved Lua interpreter. With these libraries, the size
of the VM and the complete runtime still remains reasonably small,
approximately 220KB (19 % larger than the original).
While this restricted Lua has been adapted to run inside SGX
enclaves, we still had to provide a support for communications and
the reactive streams framework itself. To do so, we use an external
vanilla Lua interpreter, with a couple adaptations that allowed the
interaction with the SGX enclaves and the LuaVM therein. Figure 3
shows the resulting architecture. We extend the Lua interface
with 3 functions: sgxprocess, sgxencrypt, and sgxdecrypt. e
rst one forwards the encrypted code and data to be processed
in the enclave, while the remaining two provide cryptographic
functionalities. In this work, we assume that aestation and key
establishment was previously performed. As a result, keys safely
reside within the enclave. We plan to release our implementation
as open-source.4
5 EVALUATION
is section reports on our extensive evaluation of SecureStreams.
First, we present our evaluation seings. en, we describe the
real-world dataset used in our macro-benchmark experiments. We
then dig into a set of micro-benchmarks that evaluate the overhead
of running the LuaVM inside the SGX enclaves. Finally, we deploy
a full SecureStreams pipeline, scaling the number of workers per
stage, to study the limits of the system in terms of throughput and
scalability.
5.1 Evaluation Settings
We have experimented on machines using a Intel® Core™ i7-6700
processor [14] and 8GiB RAM. We use a cluster of 2 machines based
on Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS (kernel 4.2.0-42-generic). e choice of
the Linux distribution is driven by compatibility reasons with the
4hps://github.com/vschiavoni/SecureStreams-DEBS17
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System layer Size (LoC)
DelayedFlights app 86
SecureStreams library 350
RxLua runtime 1, 481
Total 1, 917
Table 1: Benchmark app based on SecureStreams.
Intel® SGX SDK (v1.6). e machines run Docker (v1.13.0) and
each node joins a Docker Swarm [11] (v1.2.5) using the Consul [7]
(v0.5.2) discovery service. e Swarm manager and the discovery
service are deployed on a distinct machine. Containers building
the pipeline leverage the Docker overlay network to communicate
to each other, while machines are physically interconnected using
a switched 1Gbps network.
5.2 Input Dataset
In our experiments, we process a real-world dataset released by
the American Bureau of Transportation Statistics [19]. e dataset
reports on the ight departures and arrivals of 20 air carriers [8].
We implement a benchmark application atop of SecureStreams to
compute average delays and the total of delayed ights for each air
carrier (cf. Table 1). We design and implement the full processing
pipeline, that (i) parses the input datasets (in a comma-separated-
value format) to data structure (map), (ii) lters data by relevancy
(i.e., if the data concerns a delayed ight), and (iii) nally reduces it
to compute the desired information.5 We use the 4 last years of the
available dataset (from 2005 to 2008), for a total of 28 millions of
entries to process and 2.73GB of data.
5.3 Micro-Benchmark: Lua in SGX
We begin our evaluation with a set of micro-benchmarks to evalu-
ate performance of the integration of the LuaVM inside the SGX
enclaves. First, we estimate the cost of execution for functions in-
side the enclave. is test averages the execution time of 1 million
function calls, without any data transfer. We compare against the
same result without SGX. While non-enclaved function calls took
23.6 ns, the performances inside the enclave drop down to on aver-
age 2.35 s—i.e., approximately two orders of magnitude worse. We
then assess the cost of copying data from the unshielded execution
to the enclave and we compare it with the time required to compute
the same on the native system. We initialize a buer of 100MB with
random data and copy its content inside the enclave. e data is
split into chunks of increasing sizes. Our test executes one func-
tion call to transfer each chunk, until all data is transfered. Each
point in the plot corresponds to the average of 20 runs. Correctness
of the copies was veried by SHA256 digest comparison between
reproduced memory areas.
Figure 4 shows the results for 4 dierent variants, comparing
the native and the SGX version to only copy the data inside the
enclave (in) or to copy it inside and copying it back (in/out). When
using smaller chunks, the function call overhead plays an important
role in the total execution time. Moreover, we notice that the call
overhead steadily drops until the chunk size reaches the size of
5is experiment is inspired by Kevin Webber’s blog entry diving into Akka streams:
hps://blog.redelastic.com/diving-into-akka-streams-2770b3aeabb0.
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
64KB
tim
e 
(s)
chunk size (bytes)
SGX in
Native in
SGX in/out
Native in/out
Figure 4: Execution time to copy 100MB of memory inside
an SGX enclave (in) or to copy it back outside in/out.
64KB (vertical line). We can also notice that copying data back
to non-SGX execution imposes an overhead of at most 20 % when
compared to the one-way copy. ese initial results are used as
guidelines to drive the conguration of the streaming pipeline,
in particular with respect to the size of the chunks exchanged
between the processing stages. e larger the chunks, the smaller
the overhead induced by the transfer of data within the SGX enclave.
Once the data and the code are copied inside the enclave, the
LuaVM must indeed execute the code before returning the control.
Hence, we evaluate here the raw performances of the enclaved SGX
LuaVM. We select 6 available benchmarks from a standard suite of
tests [25]. We based this choice on their library dependencies (by
selecting the most standalone ones) and the number of input/output
instructions they execute (selecting those with the fewest I/O). Each
benchmark runs 20 times with the same pair of parameters of the
original paper, shown in the even and odd lines of Table 2. Figure 5
depicts the total time (average and standard deviation) required
to complete the execution of the 6 benchmarks. We use a bar
chart plot, where we compare the results of the Native and SGX
modes. For each of the 6 benchmarks, we present two bars next
to each other (one per executing mode) to indicate the dierent
conguration parameters used. Finally, for the sake of readability,
we use a dierent y-axis scale for the binarytrees case (from 0 to
400 s), on the right-side of the gure.
We note that, in the current version of SGX, it is required to
pre-allocate all the memory area to be used by the enclave. e
most memory-eager test (binarytrees) used more than 600MB of
memory, hence using the wall clock time comparison would not be
fair for smaller tests. In such cases, almost the whole execution time
is dedicated to memory allocation. Because of that, we subtracted
the allocation time from the measurements of enclave executions,
based on the average for the 20 runs. Fluctuations on this measure-
ment produced slight variations in the execution times, sometimes
producing the unexpected result of having SGX executions faster
than native ones (by at most 3 %). Table 2 lists the parameters along
with the maximum amount of memory used and the ratio between
runtimes of SGX and Native executions. When the memory usage
is low, the ratio between the Native and SGX versions is small—e.g.,
less than 15 % in our experiments. However, when the amount of
memory usage increases, performance drops to almost 5× worse,
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conguration memory ratio
parameter peak SGX/Native
dhrystone 50 K 275 KB 1.14
5 M 275 KB 1.04
fannkuchredux 10 28 KB 0.99
11 28 KB 1.04
nbody 2.5 M 38 KB 0.99
25 M 38 KB 1.00
richards 10 106 KB 1.02
100 191 KB 0.97
spectralnorm 500 52 KB 1.00
5 K 404 KB 0.99
binarytrees 14 25 MB 1.18
19 664 MB 4.76
Table 2: Parameters and memory usage for Lua bench-
marks.
as reected in the case of the binarytrees experiment. e smaller
the memory usage, the beer performance we can obtain from SGX
enclaves.
Synthesis. To conclude this series of micro-benchmarks, taming
the overhead of secured executions based on SGX requires bal-
ancing the size of the chunks transfered to the enclave with the
memory usage within this enclave. In the context of stream process-
ing systems, SecureStreams therefore uses reactive programming
principles to balance the load within processing stages in order to
minimize the execution overhead.
5.4 Benchmark: Streamingroughput
e previous set of experiments allowed us to verify that our design,
implementation, and the integration of the LuaVM into the SGX en-
claves is sound. Next, we deploy a SecureStreams pipeline which
includes mappers, lters and reducers. To measure the achievable
throughput of our system, as well the network overhead of our
architecture, we deploy the SecureStreams pipeline in 3 dierent
congurations. In each case, the setup of the pipeline architecture,
i.e. the creation of the set of containers, has been done in 11 s for
the lightest conguration, in 15 s for the heaviest one.
e rst conguration allows the streaming framework to blindly
bypass the SGX enclaves. Further, it does not encrypt the input
dataset before injecting it into the pipeline. is mode operates
as the baseline, yet completely unsafe, processing pipeline. e
second mode encrypts the dataset but lets the encrypted packets
skip the SGX enclaves. is conguration requires the deployers
to trust the infrastructure operator. Finally, we deploy a fully se-
cure pipeline, where the input dataset is encrypted and the data
processing is operated inside the enclaves. e data nodes inject
the dataset, split into 4 equally-sized parts, as fast as possible. We
gather bandwidth measurements by exploiting Docker’s internal
monitoring and statistical module.
e results of these deployments are presented in Figure 6. For
each of the mentioned congurations, we also vary the number of
workers per stage, from one (Figure 6-a,d,g), two (Figure 6-b,e,h),
or four (the remaining ones.) We use a representation based on
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Figure 5: Enclave versus native running times for Lua bench-
marks.
stacked percentiles. e white bar at the boom represents the min-
imum value, the pale grey on top the maximal value. Intermediate
shades of grey represent the 25th-, 50th–, and 75th-percentiles. For
instance, in Figure 6-a (our baseline) the median throughput at 200 s
into the experiment almost hits 7.5MB/s, meaning that 50 % of the
nodes in that moment are outpuing data at 7.5MB/s or less. e
baseline conguration, with only 1 worker per stage, completes in
420 s, with a peak of 12MB/s. By doubling the number of workers
reduces the processing time down to 250 s (Figure 6-d), a speed-up
of 41 %. Scaling up the workers to 4 in the baseline conguration
(Figure 6-g) did not produce a similar speed-up.
As we start injecting encrypted datasets (Figure 6-b and follow-
up congurations with 2 and 4 workers), the processing time almost
doubles (795 s). e processing of the dataset is done aer the
messages are decrypted. We also pay a penalty in terms of overall
throughput—i.e., the median value rarely exceeds 5MB/s. On the
other hand, now we observe substantial speed-ups when increasing
the workers per stage, down to 430 s and 300 s with 2 and 4 workers,
respectively.
e deployment of the most secure set of congurations (right-
most column of plots in Figure 6) shows that when using encrypted
datasets and executing the stream processing inside SGX enclaves
one must expect longer processing times and lower throughputs.
is is the (expected) price to pay for higher-security guarantees
across the full processing pipeline. Nevertheless, one can observe
that the more workers the less penalty is imposed by the end-to-end
security guarantees provided by SecureStreams.
5.5 Benchmark: Workers’ Scalability
To conclude our evaluation, we study SecureStreams in terms
of scalability. We consider a pipeline scenario similar to Figure 2
with some variations in the number of workers deployed for each
stage. We do so to beer understand to what extents the underlying
container scheduling system can exploit the hardware resources at
its disposal.
First, we increase the number of workers for each stage of the
pipeline, from 1 to 4. For each of the congurations, the experiment
is repeated 5 times. We present average and standard deviation of
the total completion time to process the full dataset in Figure 7. As
expected, we observe ideal speed-up from a conguration using
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(a) Streaming throughput. Data in clear text, no
SGX, 1 worker per stage.
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(b) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, no SGX,
1 worker per stage.
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(c) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, process-
ing SGX, 1 worker per stage.
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(d) Streaming throughput. Data in clear text, no
SGX, 2 workers per stage.
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(e) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, no SGX,
2 workers per stage.
Up
lo
ad
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (M
B/
se
c)
Time (seconds)
Max 75th 50th 25th Min
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 0  500  1000  1500  2000
(f) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, process-
ing SGX, 2 workers per stage.
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(g) Streaming throughput. Data in clear text, no
SGX, 4 workers per stage.
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(h) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, no SGX,
4 workers per stage.
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(i) Streaming throughput. Encrypted data, process-
ing SGX, 4 workers per stage.
Figure 6: roughput comparison between normal processing (with cleartext data and no encryption), encrypted data but
without enclaves, and with encrypted data and SGX processing. We scale the number of worker nodes per stage from 1 (le-
most column), 2 (center colum) and 4 (right-most column).
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Figure 7: Scalability: processing time, average and standard
deviation. e experiment is repeated 5 times, with a varia-
tion on the number of workers for each stage, each worker
using SGX.
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Figure 8: Scalability: processing time, average and standard
deviation. e experiment is repeated 5 times, with a varia-
tion on the number of mappers SGX, other workers—1 lter
worker and 1 reduce worker—do not use SGX.
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1 worker to that using 2 workers. However, in the conguration
using 4 workers by stage, we do not reach the same acceleration.
We explain this because, in this laer case, the number of deployed
containers (which equals the sum of input data streams, workers,
and routers, hence 20 containers) is greater than the number of
physical cores of the hosts (8 for each of the 2 hosts used in our
deployment—i.e., 16 cores on our evaluation cluster).
We also study the total completion time while increasing only
the number of mapper workers in the rst stage of the pipeline
(which we identied as the one consuming most resources) from 1
to 16 and maintaining the numbers of lters and reducers in the
following stages constant. As in the previous benchmark, the exper-
iment is repeated 5 times for each conguration and we measure
the average and standard deviation of the total completion time.
Figure 8 presents the results. Here again, we observe ideal speed-
up until the number of deployed containers reaches the number
of physical cores. Beyond this number, we do not observe fur-
ther improvements. ese two experiments clearly show that the
scalability of SecureStreams according the number of deployed
workers across the cluster is primarily limited by the total number
of physical cores available.
Apart from this scalability limitation, there are other factors that
reduce the observed streaming throughput, with or without involv-
ing the SGX enclaves. For instance, our throughout experiments
highlight that the system does not manage to saturate the available
network bandwidth in all cases. We believe this behaviour can be
explained by the lack of optimizations in the application logic as
well as possible tuning options of the inner ZeroMQ queues.
As part of our future work, we therefore plan to further investi-
gate these eects and to build on this knowledge to only scale the
appropriate workers in order to maximize the overall speed-up of
the deployed application. In particular, we intend to leverage the
elasticity of workers at runtime in order to cope with the memory
constraints imposed by SGX and the conguration of the underly-
ing hardware architecture, for each of the available nodes, in order
to oer the best performances for secured execution of data stream
processing applications built atop of SecureStreams.
6 RELATEDWORK
Spark [50] has recently gained a lot of traction as prominent so-
lution to implement ecient stream processing. It leverages Re-
silient Distributed Datasets (RDD) to provide a uniform view on the
data to process. Despite its popularity, Spark only handles unen-
crypted data and hence does not oer security guarantees. Recent
proposals [44] study possible soware solutions to overcome this
limitation.
Several big industrial players introduced their own stream pro-
cessing solutions. ese systems are mainly used to ingest mas-
sive amounts of data and eciently perform (real-time) analytics.
Twier’s Heron [34], and Google’s Cloud DataFlow [23] are two
prominent examples. ese systems are typically deployed on the
provider’s premises and are not oered as a service to end-users.
A few dedicated solutions exist today for distributed stream
processing using reactive programming. For instance, Reactive
Kafka [18] allows stream processing atop of Apache Kafka [5, 33].
ese solutions do not, however, support secure execution in a
trusted execution environment.
More recently, some open-source middleware frameworks (e.g.,
Apache Spark [20], Apache Storm [6], Infinispan [13]) introduced
APIs to allow developers to quickly set up and deploy stream pro-
cessing infrastructures. ese systems rely on the Java virtual
machine (JVM) [36]. However, SGX currently imposes a hard mem-
ory limit of 128 MB to the enclaved code and data, at the cost of
expensive encrypted memory paging mechanisms and serious per-
formance overheads [26, 41] when this limit is crossed. Moreover,
executing a fully-functional JVM inside an SGX enclave would
currently involve signicant re-engineering eorts.
DEFCon [38] relies also on the JVM. is event processing sys-
tem focuses on security by enforcing constraints on event ows
between processing units. e event ow control is enforced using
application-level virtualisation to separate processing units in a
ad-hoc JVM.
A few recent contributions tackle privacy-preserving data pro-
cessing, particularly in a MapReduce scenario. is is the case of
Airavat [42] and Gupt [39]. ese systems leverage dierential-
privacy techniques [29] and can face a dierent threat model than
the one supported by SGX and hence by SecureStreams. In partic-
ular, when deploying such systems on a public infrastructure, one
needs to trust the cloud provider. Our system greatly reduces the
trust boundaries, and only requires trust of Intel® and their SGX
implementation.
Some authors contest that public clouds may be secure enough
some parts of an application. ey propose to split the jobs, running
only the critical parts in private clouds. A privacy-aware framework
on hybrid clouds [49] has been proposed to work on tagged data,
at dierent granularity levels. A MapReduce preprocessor splits
data into private and public clouds according to their sensitivity.
Sedic [51] does not oer the same tagging granularity, but proposes
to automatically modify reducers to optimize the data transfers in a
hybrid cloud. ese solutions require spliing application and data
in two parts (sensitive and not) and impose higher latencies due to
data transfers between two dierent clouds. Yet, they cannot oer
beer security guarantees that the soware stack itself oers, be it
public or private.
MrCrypt [47] proposes using homomorphic encryption instead
of trusted elements. rough static code analysis, it pinpoints
dierent homomorphic encryption schemes for every data column.
Still, some of the demonstrated benchmarks are ten times slower
than the unecrypted execution. SecureStreams avoids of complex
encryption schemes, decrypts data entering enclaves and processes
in plaintext.
e Styx [45] system uses partial homorphic encryption to al-
low for ecient stream processing in trusted cloud environments.
Interestingly, the authors of that system mention Intel® SGX as
possible alternative to deploy stream processing systems on trusted
hardware oered by untrusted/malicious cloud environments. Se-
cureStreams oers insights on the performances of exactly this
approach.
To best of our knowledge, SecureStreams is the rst lightweight
and low-memory footprint stream processing framework that can
fully execute within SGX enclaves.
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As we described before, SecureStreams is executing pro-
cesses taking advantage of SGX enclaves inside Docker contain-
ers. SCONE [40], which is not yet openly available, is a recently
introduced system that oers a secure container mechanism for
Docker to leverage the SGX trusted execution support. It proposes
a generic technology to embed any C program to execute inside an
SGX enclave. Rather than generic programs, SecureStreams oers
support to execute a lightweight LuaVM inside an SGX enclave and
securely execute chunks of Lua code inside it. In our experiments,
we execute this LuaVM inside Docker containers.
7 CONCLUSION
Secure stream processing is becoming a major concern in the era
of the Internet of ings and big data. is paper introduces our
design and evaluation of SecureStreams, an concise and ecient
middleware framework to implement, deploy and evaluate secure
stream processing pipelines for continuous data streams. e frame-
work is designed to exploit the SGX trusted execution environments
readily available in Intel®’s commodity processors, such as the
latest SkyLake. We implemented the prototype of SecureStreams
in Lua and based its APIs on the reactive programming approach.
Our initial evaluation results based on real-world traces are en-
couraging, and pave the way for deployment of stream processing
systems over sensitive data on untrusted public clouds.
We plan in our future work to further extend and thoroughly eval-
uate SecureStreams against other known approaches on secure
stream processing, like Styx [45], MrCrypt [47] or DEFCon [38]. In
particular, we plan to extend SecureStreams with full automation
of container deployments, as well as enriching the framework with
a library of standard stream processing operators and ecient yet
secure native plugins, to ease the development of complex stream
processing pipelines.
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